The State of Utah v. Sydney Arthur Wengreen : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
The State of Utah v. Sydney Arthur Wengreen :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James Swink; Karen Klucznik; Mark Shurtleff; Attorneys for Appellee.
Mark McBride; Criminal Defense Associates; Attorney for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Wengreen, No. 20051018 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6125
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
SYDNEY ARTHUR WENGREEN, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
Appeals No. 20051018-CA 
Dist. Ct. Case No. 021100187 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, CACHE COUNTY, 
HONORABLE JUDGE WILMORE PRESIDING 
Appellant is presently incarcerated in connection with this appeal. 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
MARK MCBRIDE (UTAH BAR No. 08969) 
468 North Camden Drive 
Suite 211 
Beverly Hills, CA 90210 
Telephone: (310) 858-5588 
Fax: (310) 388-0686 
JAMES SWINK 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
11 West 100 North, 2nd Floor 
Logan, UT 84321 
Attorneys for Appellee 
State of Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
Sydney Arthur Wengreen 
FILED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
SYDNEY ARTHUR WENGREEN, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
Appeals No. 20051018-CA 
Dist. Ct. Case No. 021100187 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, CACHE COUNTY, 
HONORABLE JUDGE WILMORE PRESIDING 
Appellant is presently incarcerated in connection with this appeal. 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
MARK MCBRIDE (UTAH BAR No. 08969) 
468 North Camden Drive 
Suite 211 
Beverly Hills, CA 90210 
Telephone: (310) 858-5588 
Fax: (310) 388-0686 
Attorney for Appellant 
Sydney Arthur Wengreen 
JAMES SWINK 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
11 West 100 North, 2nd Floor 
Logan, UT 84321 
Attorneys for Appellee 
State of Utah 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Table of Authorities 4 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. WENGREEN'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OF THE PROSECUTRIX'S 
MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS 5 
A. "ELEMENT OF HIS DEFENSE" 5 
B. THE MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS WERE PROPERLY SHOWN 
TO BE EXCULPATORY 7 
1. Sufficient Outside Sources 7 
2 It is Reasonably Certain that the Records 
Would Have Been Exculpatory. 8 
H. THE NEW TRIAL MOTION SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN GRANTED 9 
in. CONCLUSION ii 
CERTD7ICATE OF SERVICE 12 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Federal Cases Page 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) 6, 7 
State Cases 
Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61 9 
State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113 passim 
State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51 6-8 
State v. Gonzalez, 2005 UT 72 5-7 
State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15 9-10 
Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72 9 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. 78-35a- 104(e)(iii) (2002) 9 
Utah Rule of Evidence 506 5 
4 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. WENGREEN'S MOTION TO 
COMPEL DISCOVERY OF THE PROSECUTRIX'S MENTAL HEALTH 
RECORDS 
A. "ELEMENT OF HIS DEFENSE" 
Regarding the "element of his defense" prong under Utah Rule of Evidence 506, 
the State argues that Mr. Wengreen has not met the standards spelled out in State v. 
Gonzalez, 2005 UT 72. With due respect to the State, Gonzalez does not quite stand for 
what the State says it does. The State's position on Gonzalez is that that case provides a 
great bit of clarity on what "element of his defense" means. But that is not so. In the 
portion of Gonzalez relied on chiefly by the State here, the Utah Supreme Court denied 
Gonzalez's request to review the alleged victim's mental health records primarily 
because defense counsel had obtained those records fraudulently - and not necessarily 
because Gonzalez had failed to satisfy the "element of his defense" language. 
Gonzalez is a lengthy opinion; it is 76 paragraphs. The State, in its responsive 
brief, relies chiefly on but four paragraphs in the opinion. Those paragraphs are quoted 
here in full: 
% 42 Next, Mr. Gonzales argues that he was entitled to review 
Jessicafs mental health records because her mental health is an 
element or claim of his defense. Utah Rule of Evidence 506, which 
defines a privilege between a patient and a mental health therapist, 
excludes communications that concern a patient's condition where 
the condition is "an element of any claim or defense." This is the 
same wording that is found on the UNI form that Mr. Montgomery 
filled out. Mr. Gonzales argues that Jessica's mental health was an 
element of a claim or defense in the lawsuit, and therefore his 
s 
request for the records was proper. 
1f 43 Mr. Gonzales's argument is flawed in two ways. First, his 
defense is simply "I didn't do it." He wishes to use Jessica's mental 
health records to impeach her credibility as a witness-part of his 
defense strategy, but not actually an element of his defense. Second, 
regardless of whether Jessica's mental health is an "element" of Mr. 
Gonzales's defense, it is the process by which the records were 
obtained, not the status of the records as privileged or unprivileged, 
that prevents Mr. Gonzales from reviewing them. Even if it were 
true that the records were an element of the defense, or were never 
privileged in the first place, Mr. Gonzales would still be obligated to 
obtain them using the proper avenue. 
Tf 44 Mr. Montgomery used a flawed subpoena process to obtain 
privileged records. His authority to examine those records, however 
obtained, depended on approval of the trial court following an in 
camera review. Drawing on a United States Supreme Court case, 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 
(1987), we made this clear in State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, 982 P.2d 
79. We stated: In Ritchie, the Supreme Court held that where an 
exception to privilege allows a defendant access to otherwise 
confidential records, the defendant does not have the right to 
examine all of the confidential information or to search through state 
files without supervision. However, if a defendant can show with 
reasonable certainty that exculpatory evidence exists which would 
be favorable to his defense, Ritchie gives him the right to have the 
otherwise confidential records reviewed by the trial court to 
determine if they contain material evidence. 
[WJhere "a defendant is aware of specific information contained in 
the file ..., he is free to request it directly from the court, and argue in 
favor of its materiality." Cardall, 1999 UT 51 at fflf 30, 32, 982 P.2d 
79 (citations omitted). 
Tf 45 Here, Mr. Montgomery was obligated to seek an in camera 
review of Jessica's mental health records before searching through 
them. Because he did not follow proper procedures in subpoenaing 
the records or requesting an in camera review, we affirm the trial 
courts conclusion that the subpoenas must be quashed. 
State v. Gonzalez, 2005 UT 72, at paras 42-45 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
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The underlined language above is extremely telling regarding the concept of 
"element of his defense." One: the Court denied Gonzalez's request principally because 
defense counsel obtained the records improperly. That is to say: it appears that the 
Gonzalez Court really did not reach, in the substantive sense, whether Gonzalez had 
made the requisite "element of his defense" showing. Indeed, the Court's header 
regarding the above-quoted section speaks not to an "element of his defense," but reads: 
"B. Failure to Turn over Records to Court for In Camera Review." And, toward that end, 
the Gonzalez Court bounces back to the language in Cardall, which in turn uses the 
Ritchie language, to establish the standards used to determine whether a litigant may 
inspect a witness's mental health records. 
B THE MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS WERE PROPERLY SHOWN 
TO BE EXCULPATORY 
1. Sufficient Outside Sources 
The narrow question here is whether the alleged victim's own discussions, as well 
as the documents drafted about her, which were conveyed to the officer assembling the 
presentence report, constitute a sufficient outside source under State v. Blake, 2002 UT 
113. Clearly they do. 
On this topic, Blake reads: 
Where a defendant's request for in camera review is accompanied by 
specific facts justifying the review, a court will be much more likely 
to find "with reasonable certainty that exculpatory evidence exists 
which would be favorable to his defense." Id. at ^ 30. However, 
when the request is a general one, such as the request in this case for 
any impeachment material that might happen to be found in the 
privileged records, a court ought not to grant in camera review. At a 
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minimum, specific facts must be alleged. These might include 
references to records of only certain counseling sessions, which are 
alleged to be relevant, independent allegations made by others that a 
victim has recanted, or extrinsic evidence of some disorder that 
might lead to uncertainty regarding a victim's trustworthiness. This 
listing is not intended to be exclusive, but is only an example of the 
type and quality of proof needed to overcome the high Cardall 
hurdle. 
Blake, at para. 22 (emphasis added). 
Here, and even putting aside the letters provided to the sentencing officer, none 
other than the prosecutrix herself revealed facts, on the heels of trial, that her story at trial 
could very well have been inaccurate. It is Mr. Wengreen's position that when the 
alleged victim provides facts which make his / her trial story unlikely (as well as letters 
provided to the presentence officer), the sufficient outside sources requirement in Blake 
has been met. 
3 It is Reasonably Certain that the Records Would Have been Exculpatory 
The Blake Court discusses the various types of information which could properly 
be seen as exculpatory: "This situation differs markedly from cases where a criminal 
defendant can point to information from outside sources suggesting that a victim has 
recanted or accused another of the crime alleged or has a history of mental illness 
relevant to the victim's ability to accurately report on the assault." Blake, supra, at para. 
21 (emphasis added). 
Notwithstanding defense counsel's comment's at the quash hearing (which the 
State frames as concessions), it is Mr. Wengreen's position that, under the "history of 
mental illness" language in Blake, he has demonstrated that the mental health records 
g 
contain, with reasonable certainty, exculpatory evidence. Specifically, it is highly 
unlikely that the alleged victim in this case does not have a history of mental illness. It is 
highly unlikely that her statements, post-trial, which were fantastic and contradictory, 
simply popped up out of the blue. Her statements, post-trial, indicate an individual who 
suffers from a mental disorder which affects her ability to relay facts accurately, and 
which affects her ability to judge what did or did not happen between her and Mr. 
Wengreen. 
II 
THE NEW TRIAL MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
The bottom line is whether there is, as the State essentially argues, a procedural 
bar on granting a new trial when the alleged victim explains at trial that she was touched 
only on the buttocks, but then, just after trial, reports contact of a much more serious 
nature. There is of course no such bar in Utah's case law, and the new trial motion 
should have been granted. 
In State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, the State requested that the Supreme Court adopt a 
very rigorous standard when discussing whether new trial motions should be granted. The 
Pinder Court responded: " 
The State would have us adopt the newly discovered evidence 
test recently utilized in situations involving petitions for post-
conviction relief. See Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72, ffif 9, 13, 61 
P.3d 978; Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61, fflf 15, 20, 52 P.3d 1168. In 
Wickham and Julian, we applied the language of the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, which states that newly discovered 
evidence does not warrant post-conviction relief if the new evidence 
is "merely impeachment evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
104(e)(iii) (2002). Despite potentially misleading dicta to the 
contrary, we have never held that "mere" impeachment evidence is 
insufficient in all situations to justify the granting of a new trial in 
the course of regular appellate review. 
Therefore, we reaffirm that newly discovered impeachment 
evidence can justify the granting of a new trial in certain situations. 
See Montova, 2004 UT 5 at 1f 11, 84 P.3d 1183. 
[22] [23] If 67 As a result, it is proper for the trial court, when 
confronted with a motion for a new trial due to newly discovered 
evidence, to consider the credibility of new witnesses as well as the 
manner in which new evidence meshes or clashes with evidence 
presented at trial. See id. 
Pinder, supra, at n. 11 and para. 67 (emphasis added). 
Even putting aside in the instant case the principle that the alleged victim's post-
trial revelations speak to her ability to tell the truth (and they certainly do), there is no bar 
- and there should be no bar here - to a situation where egregious impeachment evidence 
is grounds for a new trial. Of course, Mr. Wengreen attached to his new trial motion a 
trenchant discussion from a therapist regarding the victim's mental health, which 
discussed her very ability to report even bare facts, but clearly the jury would have like to 
have heard the victim's dramatic change in stories. It was first: he touched me on the 
buttocks; then it was conduct of a much more severe nature. Which is it? There is 
clearly a difference between the two stories, and this new evidence should get to the jury. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
10 
Ill 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Wengreen's convictions should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of March, 2007. 
LAW OFFICES OF MARK MCBRIDE, PC. 
Mark McBride 
Attorney for Appellant 
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